Chechen Forces in the South Ossetian Conflict

By Saipti Gelayev

The participation of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Chechen special purpose units “Vostok” and “Zapad”
in the armed conflict in South Ossetia caused a controversy in Chechnya

In Chechnya, it is believed that the official counts of Russian military losses during the fighting in South Ossetia have been greatly understated.  In Chechnya alone, many bodies of killed soldiers have been delivered from the Intelligence Directorate special purpose battalions “Vostok” and “Zapad”, which consist of ethnic Chechens.  The Ministry of Defense reports 74 soldiers killed altogether.

The Chechen special forces, though they prefer not to speak of losses suffered, express strong displeasure regarding their commanders.  In the words of one “Vostok” soldier, they were “set up”.

“Our battalion was added to the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Southern Ossetia last fall.  Before the beginning of these events (meaning the Georgian offensive into Tskhinvali), there were two companies of our battalion here.” said one of the “Vostok” servicemen, who called himself Vakhid, “Even though we were ready for possible provocation, a mass attack on Tskhinvali was nevertheless unanticipated.”

They practically set us up there.  The turrets on the tanks given to us didn’t work; our armored vehicles broke down nearly every hundred meters.  The Georgians, meanwhile, brought massive fire on our positions from “Grad” rocket launchers and long-range artillery, Georgian planes bombed us, and we, realistically, weren’t able to give them a serious response.  Men were killed in our group, including our commander.”

“There (in Tskhinvali), it was real hell.  Over the course of all of these days we weren’t able to communicate with our families, who naturally were very worried, because there was no way to reach us and we were unable to recharge our cell phones.  My older brother broke through to us on the third day because there was information that we had all been killed.  We were practically all on the brink of extermination, if not for the ‘Kadyrovsky’ regiment^[1] , who came to our aid.” he said unexpectedly.  “They stopped the Georgian attack and saved us from certain death.”

The Russian and Chechen authorities did not announce that, along with “Vostok”, there were other Chechen subdivisions sent to South Ossetia.  Furthermore, there is little information about causalities; the only official reports are of three wounded “Vostok” soldiers in South Ossetia.

“Literally the day after the beginning of fighting in Tskhinvali, 100 men from a subdivision of the presidential security service were sent there from Khosi-Yurt (the home village of the Kadyrovs, also called Tsentroi).  Naturally, no one will ever confirm this information,” a source from the president’s entourage told this journalist in a private conversation.

However, not all soldiers of the elite special purpose unit “Vostok” were ready to take part in the fighting, according to Vakhid.  “Lots of guys, of course, didn’t want to go to war.  After all, practically everyone in Chechnya knows what war is, if you’re seriously wounded – god forbid – they’ll just write you off.  Who needs you other than your relatives?  But we didn’t have a choice; we’re military men without free will.  They’ve given the order and off we go!  Those who didn’t want to go were warned that they’d be forced out of the army with a ‘wolf ticket’.  In other words, your contract with the Defense Ministry is cancelled and you won’t receive any money (many are owed substantial sums for back pay). So the choice was the lesser of two evils – going to war, in our case.”

According to the latest information, the overall losses of the two special purpose units from Chechnya in South Ossetia number approximately 70 people. 

“I can say with certainty that seven of our guys, who were killed in Southern Ossetia and returned to Urus-Martanovsky, had their throats cut.” said a resident of Urus Martan. “More likely than not, it was ex-militants who did it; they say that in the Georgian army there are Chechen subdivisions.  Only they could have done this, possibly as revenge for the actions of ‘Vostok’ and ‘Zapad’ against them in Chechnya.”

In the opinion of many social activists and rights defenders in Chechnya, the deployment of military subdivisions formed on an ethnic basis to South Ossetia was a serious mistake by Russian leadership.  Some are disposed to believe, however, that it was not done without forethought.

“To send ‘Chechen’ special forces into South Ossetia, I believe, was wrong.” said Chechen historian Murad Nashkhoev.  “The Georgians, Ossetians, along with many other peoples of the Caucasus, are brother nations.  People of the Caucasus shouldn’t take sides in such conflicts.  We ought use all our means so as to not allow bloodshed, to reconcile the conflicting parties, and to in no way help one kill the other.  After all, the Caucasus – it’s our common home.”

“We had a sad experience with ‘volunteers’ in Abkhazia during the war in 1992.  At that time, the main hero of Abkhazia, and later in Chechnya, was Shamil Basayev, who later transformed into an international terrorist.  Who can give a guarantee that a new ‘hero’ won’t appear today?  They say that Sulim Yamadayev, who is on the federal wanted list, also fought in Tskhinvali.  There could be Ulman there with his comrades, as well.  Who will go to a war to arrest war criminals?”  Eduard Ulman, together with other servicemen, was accused of killing civilians in Chechnya during the second Chechen war, but remains at large.

The commander of “Vostok” Sulim Yamadayev was added to the federal wanted list this summer after a conflict arose between him and Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov.  According to the testimony of several journalists, he took part in battles in South Ossetia. 

“For centuries, Russia has purposefully driven a wedge between the peoples of the Caucasus in order to bring to life the old imperial principle: ‘divide and conquer’,” said the director of “Memorial” in Grozny, Shakhman Akbulatov.  “Moscow can turn the Ossetians and the Ingush on each other when needed, as it was in 1992.  Moscow can also unfurl bloody conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and sow animosity between Chechens and Dagestani, like in 1999 (Basayev’s infamous campaign in the neighboring republic).  It can also organize ‘Nord-Ost’ and Beslan, once again leading to the intolerance and hatred between peoples.  I think that if there was not secretive and obvious interference by the Kremlin in all of these conflicts which occurred on the post-Soviet space, then the Georgians, Ossetians, Abkhazi, and Ingush, and all the other peoples of the Caucasus would live in peace and agreement.”

An expert on the North Caucasus at the Moscow Helsinki group, Aslambek Apayev, voiced a similar opinion.  “I’ve read General Ermolov’s notes, and I remember the words he said to the so-called native police, which was created out of peoples of the Caucasus by the Russian command to use in conflicts with the locals.  The General said that: ‘I have never had the use for this scum (i.e. the police force), but, having formed it, if there should be strife, it will be useful in the coming times.’  The very same principle is adhered to by the Russian authorities today, sending national and Cossack formations into the conflict zone.  Moscow needs conflict between the peoples of the Caucasus, even today.  I, like any normal person, hate any war, as it brings only death and despair to people, and I sympathize with all innocent civilians on the Ossetian side and the Georgian side.

The Russian military command thought highly of the fighting capabilities of Chechen special forces.  In materials about the military actions by Russian forces in South Ossetia published last week in the newspaper “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, an unidentified Russian Paratrooper General highly rated the fighting capabilities of soldiers of the “Chechen” battalions and admitted they were a head above any other Russian subdivision in the zone of conflict.

“For me it’s unimportant who killed who in South Ossetia, Georgians – Ossetians, Russians – Georgians, it was people killing people,”  said another resident of the Republic. “The civilian population suffered: Ossetian and Georgian.  Russia, who became involved in this conflict as a ‘peacekeeper’, really has no moral right.  Let Putin remember what his army created here a few years ago.  And to me it’s incomprehensible why the Russian leadership so furiously defends the right of Ossetian and Abkhazi independence, when at the same time they stripped the Chechens of this right.  It is utter cynicism and a scoff at the norms of international law from Moscow.  Chechens have no less right to freedom than Ossetians and Abkhazi, who naturally, like any other people on earth, have a right to self-determination.”

 Saipti Gelayev, independent journalist in Grozny, Chechnya.

source: http://www.peaceinthecaucasus.org/articles/2008.08.18.chechen_forces_sossetia.html

Filed under: Russia vs Georgia

Senior U.S. Delegations Hope To ‘Reset’ U.S.-Russia Relations

By Robert Coalson

Several high-level delegations of former U.S. officials have been in Moscow for meetings this month aimed at rejuvenating U.S.-Russian relations ahead of U.S. President Barack Obama’s first meeting with his Russian counterpart in London on April 1.

The so-called “wise men” are urging a pragmatic approach to relations that emphasizes shared interests such as preventing nuclear proliferation, reaching a new strategic arms agreement, and combating terrorism.

However, there are concerns among some of Russia’s neighbors that a new pragmatism will curtail their ambitions to integrate with the West.

James Baker, who was U.S. secretary of state under President George H.W. Bush and is among the high-profile American statesmen touring Moscow this week, emphasized common interests when speaking to Reuters on March 19.

“It’s important that U.S.-Russian relations get back on track, if you will, because we have so many interests that converge,” Baker said. “Yes, we have some differences. We’ll have to manage those differences. But in many, many areas the interests of Russia and the United States converge.”

“It’s very much in the interests of both countries to have the best possible bilateral relationship they can,” Baker continued. “And it’s also, frankly, in the interests of the world that these two countries with 95 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world have the best possible relationship they can.”

Mutual Interests

In recent days, the meetings convening in Moscow included former U.S. secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Republican U.S. Senator Sam Nunn.

The Russian side is represented by former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and former Chief of the General Staff Yury Baluyevsky.

Medvedev met earlier this month with another senior delegation, headed by former Democratic Senator Gary Hart, former Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. That group was in town to present its own 30-page report of recommendations for improving relations.

The Hart-Hagel commission report urged a focus on shared interests, including dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, strengthening the international nonproliferation regime, stabilizing Afghanistan, and reducing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

It also urged reducing bilateral tensions by accepting “that neither Ukraine nor Georgia is ready for NATO membership” and taking “a new look at missile-defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.”

Medvedev met with commission members on March 10 and told them he is encouraged by the signals coming out of Washington.

“Unfortunately, our relations have degraded significantly over the past several years. We are saddened by this fact,” Medvedev said. “We believe we have every opportunity to open a new page in Russian-U.S. relations. The signals that we’re receiving today from the United States — I mean the signals I’m receiving from President Obama — seem entirely positive to me.”

It remains unknown how influential such recommendations will be within the Obama administration, although Hagel is a close foreign-policy adviser to the new president and was reportedly a candidate to become secretary of state.

At a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Geneva on March 6, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized a similar agenda, especially the need for a new strategic-arms agreement, as the START 1 treaty expires at the end of this year.

“We intend to have an agreement by the end of the year. This is of the highest priority to our governments,” Clinton said. “I believe we will be instructed by both of our presidents to make sure we do have an agreement, and we’re going to get to work immediately.”

Bulking Up

Just 10 days later, though, Medvedev announced a major upgrading of Russia’s strategic forces, citing the threat from NATO as its justification. “The threats of local conflicts and international terrorism are still present,” Medvedev said. “NATO’s attempts to expand its military infrastructure near our country’s borders continue. All this requires a qualitative modernization of our armed forces, giving them a new, modern shape.”

It is possible this announcement is intended primarily as posturing before the opening of new strategic-arms talks.

The apparently warming relations between Washington and Moscow have raised concerns, particularly in Ukraine and Georgia.

The Hart-Hagel report argues that Russia has “legitimate interests” in “the region bridging Europe, and the Middle East.” It concedes that “the United States should avoid zero-sum competition for influence there. Such competition is bound to damage American interests, especially because Russia is located in the region and the United States is not. As a result, attempts to pull countries away from Russia or to block legal Russian activities are unlikely to succeed.”

It adds that U.S. interests “are not identical to those of Russia’s neighbors and [Washington must] avoid becoming their instrument in dealing with Russia.”

Alexander Rondeli, president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, told RFE/RL’s Georgian Service that the new U.S. position is a setback for Georgian ambitions to integrate with the West.

“I think to a certain extent Russia has bullied both us and NATO and everybody else — including some who didn’t expect they would be intimidated,” Rondeli said.

“By doing that, [Russia] has sidetracked the issue [of Georgian NATO membership], but that does not mean we have to give it up.”

Russian political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky, who has been harshly critical of the Russian government under Vladimir Putin and Medvedev, told RFE/RL’s Russian Service that he believes U.S. expectations for greater cooperation with Russia will be “disappointed.”

“There is another serious factor: Russian domestic politics,” he said. “You see, considering there is a deep economic crisis and growing social tension, the Putin regime cannot allow itself the luxury of giving up such a remarkable enemy as the United States.”

republished from http://www.rferl.org/content/Senior_US_Delegations_Hope_To_Reset_US_Russia_Relations/1514015.html

Filed under: Strategic Issues

Georgia Intelligence Chief: Russia Trying To Sow “Disorder”

TBILISI, Georgia (AFP)–Georgia’s intelligence chief Friday accused Russia of seeking to sow “internal disorder” ahead of large-scale opposition protests due here next month.

 

In a report to parliament, Foreign Intelligence Service chief Gela Bezhuashvili also said it was unlikely Georgia would soon see a repeat of its war with Russia last year over the rebel South Ossetia region.

 

“A large-scale military action or aggression from Russia is less probable in the near future,” he said. “Today, (Russia) is seeking to increase pressure on Georgia through other means…to remove the Georgian authorities through internal disorder and destabilization.” He alleged that Russia had already allocated funds and personnel to the cause but provided no other details.

 

His remarks came as opposition groups prepare to launch a series of protests April 9 aimed at toppling President Mikhail Saakashvili.

Pressure has been mounting on Saakashvili since the August war with Russia, with many here, including some former allies, accusing him of mishandling the conflict.

 

Georgian officials have repeatedly hinted at links between the opposition and Russia, which government critics say is part of a smear campaign to undermine their support.

 

The president has also alleged that Russia was involved in demonstrations in November 2007 that degenerated into violence when riot police dispersed thousands of anti-government protesters.

 

republished from Dow Jones NewsPlus http://www.djnewsplus.com

Filed under: Russia vs Georgia

GEORGIA: SAAKASHVILI ADMINISTRATION TURNS GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS TO ITS ADVANTAGE

By Molly Corso, a freelance editor in Tbilisi

On a recent morning at Tbilisi’s central construction market, the labyrinth of passages and storefronts were largely quiet. Just three months ago, Edik, a 56 year-old shop owner, was making 700 lari ($419) in sales per day. These days, amid the global economic slowdown, a typical day generates as little as 50 lari (roughly $30) in income.

“Yesterday, I made 30 lari (about $18),” he laughed.

For Georgia’s fragmented opposition parties, the downturn seemed to offer a chance to attract new support. But even as they tout a large turnout for an April 9 protest rally, opposition parties appear to be losing out on a golden political opportunity: they have yet to make the country’s economic woes a priority issue.

While the opposition focuses on media rights and justice reform, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration has been striving to turn the economic troubles to its advantage. And in many ways, the government has succeeded in retaining the initiative on economic issues. In a March 17 televised cabinet meeting, for example, Saakashvili described Georgia as in “a major existential struggle,” and stressed the need for $1 billion in foreign investment to avoid an economic meltdown.

“Georgia should be among the several countries listed as quite successful [despite the world crisis], where it is advantageous to invest money. This is our task,” he told ministers.
Despite earlier concerns that the Georgian economy would crumble under the double-whammy of war and worldwide recession, local economists are cautiously optimistic that the country can make it through the downturn relatively unscathed. That prospect is helping to bolster the beleaguered Saakashvili administration.

According to a January 2009 report from the International Monetary Fund, the Georgian economy grew 3.5 percent in 2008, and is anticipated to grow 4 percent this year. To meet that target, Prime Minister Nika Gilauri launched a 2-billion-lari ($1.2 billion) stimulus package in January that emphasizes job creation and social welfare protection over defense spending.

One of the stimulus plan’s top priorities is shoring up the ailing construction sector. Accordingly, the government is aiming to create up to 30,000 new jobs by carrying out a variety of infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labor, Healthcare, and Social Welfare is slated to receive nearly 1.5 billion lari ($898 million, an increase of nearly $120 million from 2008) in 2009, while the Ministry of Defense saw its budget slashed by nearly 600 million lari (over $350 million) to 950 million lari (about $569 million).

At the same time, the government is taking a more activist approach toward the economy. For example, earlier this year, the government bought 55,000 tons of fertilizers from Energy-Invest, a Russian-backed manufacturing company that is one of Georgia’s largest companies, to help safeguard the firm’s 3,000 jobs after the international fertilizer market crashed late in 2008.

Over the past week, Saakashvili has also made trips to the Georgian countryside, promising farmers free fertilizers and other government aid to help make it through the spring planting season.

The government is counting on $4.5 billion in outside assistance this year to help balance a budget that was heavily dependent on foreign direct investment. Such investment barely cleared $1 billion in 2008, a 50 percent drop from 2007, according to government data. No figures are available for 2009 yet.

American economist Edward Raupp believes that the government’s stimulus package will provide some relief in the face of lost foreign direct investment (FDI). “I think it will have an effect,” said Raupp, who is chancellor of Tbilisi’s University of Georgia. “It won’t replace $1 billion in FDI, but it will go a long way.”

The Georgian banking sector — in particular the country’s two largest banks, Bank of Georgia and TBC — have also received hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance from the International Finance Corporation and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The aid is being used to shore up liquidity and to encourage lending.

Construction and real estate development are the two sectors that fueled much of the Georgian banking industry’s rapid growth. Shota Khatiashvili, an executive at Tbilisi’s Bageby City Group, a high-end real estate developer, notes that the crisis has depressed both prices and consumer demand, but he added that property sales are still showing signs of life. The company has sold three flats in Tbilisi this year — compared with two per month before the crisis — and one in the Black Sea port city of Batumi. “[W]ith the new price[s], the sales are still there,” Khatiashvili said. “They are just smaller.”

republished from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031809c.shtml

Filed under: Business

Russia charges “deserter”, Georgia won’t extradite

By Dmitry Solovyov

MOSCOW, March 17 (Reuters) – A Russian soldier who upset Moscow by leaving his unit and turning up in Georgia has been charged with desertion, Russian prosecutors said on Tuesday, while Tbilisi said it had no plans to extradite the fugitive.

“The Military Investigative Directorate has launched this criminal case,” said a spokesman for the Russian Military Prosecutor’s office. “Desertion is punished by up to seven years in jail.”

Sergeant Alexander Glukhov disappeared in January from his unit in breakaway South Ossetia and said he wanted asylum in Georgia, angering Moscow and handling a public relations coup to the pro-Western government in Tbilisi.

Georgia and Russia fought a war last August over South Ossetia, a breakaway pro-Russian province of Georgia. Tbilisi’s forces tried to retake it, unleashing a massive counter-attack by Russian troops.

Russia now demands Glukhov should be extradited by Georgia, but Georgian Interior Ministry spokesman Shota Utiashvili ruled this out. “Georgia will not discuss extraditing Glukhov to Russia until the issue of granting him political asylum in Georgia has been decided,” Utiashvili said.

Dressed in jeans and trainers and eating a “Big Mac” hamburger, Glukhov told Reuters at a McDonald’s outlet in Tbilisi in January that he had fled his military unit because conditions with Russian forces in South Ossetia were unbearable.

Russia’s defence ministry had originally maintained that Glukhov was captured by Georgian forces and kept in Tbilisi against his will. It later appealed to him to return to Russia, saying he was a disciplined soldier, no legal action would be taken against him and he would be sent to continue service in another unit.

The defence ministry brought Glukhov’s mother to South Ossetia, but the soldier declined to meet her in an area lying close to Russian military positions. (Additional reporting by Niko Mchedlishvili in Tbilisi; editing by Mark Trevelyan)

republished from http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLH547179

Filed under: Russia vs Georgia

Weekly Market Scan

The FINANCIAL — Last week the Galt & Taggart Index (GTI) declined 0.93% in GEL terms on a trading volume of GEL 260. One blue chip stock traded on the Georgian Stock Exchange: People’s Bank (AMB, down 50%). Blue chips accounted for 100% of the total weekly trading volume.  

Bank of Georgia’s global depositary receipts (GDRs) rose by 14.1% last week on the London Stock Exchange (BGEO LI) to US$ 2.1. A total of 2,211,078 GDRs traded on the LSE last week.

Economy

Ex-minister cuts GDP growth expectations to negative. Georgia’s former Minister of Economic Development Kakha Bendukidze signaled the country’s GDP will likely shrink in 2009 due to repercussions from last summer’s conflict with Russia, compounded by the global economic slowdown, Bloomberg News reported. The National Bank of Georgia earlier placed FY09 GDP growth expectations at 2%, roughly equal to 2008’s increase. The war with Russia is estimated to have cost the Georgian economy US$ 1bn in damages. Bendukidze, a former general manager of Russia’s largest heavy machinery producer OMZ Gruppa Uralmash-Izhora, currently holds no official Georgian government position.  

CPI climbs 1.4% m/m. January CPI grew 1.4% m/m, a 1ppt increase from December’s 0.4% growth, according to the Georgian statistics committee. 12M e-o-p CPI as of January 31 declined 1.1ppts m/m to 4.4%, significantly lower than in neighboring states, including Ukraine (22.3%), Kyrgyzstan (18.3%), Russia (13.4%), Azerbaijan (11.8%), Latvia (9.8%), Lithuania (9.6%), and Kazakhstan (8.7%).  

Foreign debt  

Total government debt at US$ 2.6bn. Georgia’s total foreign debt and state-guaranteed loans amounted to US$ 2.6bn as of January 31, according to the Ministry of Finance. Georgia currently has 16 countries-bilateral creditors, including Germany (US$ 158.68mn), Russia (US$ 119.43mn), Japan (US$ 58.26mn), Turkey (US$ 41.77mn), and the US (US$ 38.31mn), as well as Azerbaijan, Iran, Armenia, Kazakhstan, China, Kuwait, and the Netherlands, at less than US$ 30mn each.  

Georgia also owes US$ 1.59bn to international financial institutions and organizations, including the IMF (US$ 446.74mn), World Bank (US$ 959.17mn), International Fund of Agricultural Development (US$ 13.5mn), Asian Development Bank (US$ 70.85mn), EBRD (US$ 28.28mn), and EU (US$ 74.17mn).

Company News

CEI 4Q operating profit grows 478% q/q. Caucasus Energy & Infrastructure (NRGY GG) reported FY08 revenues of GEL 14.7mn (US$ 8.7mn) and operating profit of GEL 13.6mn (US$ 8.0mn), with the lion’s share of the company’s revenues generated by non-operating activities. CEI showed GEL 11.5mn (US$ 6.8mn) in FY08 net income.

FX Market  

Last week the GEL appreciated 1% against the US$. The weekly turnover on the Tbilisi Interbank Currency Exchange (TICEX) was US$ 16.4mn, US$ 21mn less than the previous week. The National Bank of Georgia ’s (NBG) net purchases were US$ 11.7mn.

Filed under: Markets

Russia’s Coming War with Georgia

By: Pavel Felgenhauer

Six months after the French-brokered agreement ended the Russo-Georgia war on August 12, 2008 the ceasefire continues to be fragile with constant incidents that both sides describe as “provocations.” Last month the Defense Ministry of the separatist South Ossetia said Georgia was moving troops towards its border (RIA-Novosti, January 9). This week the South Ossetian authorities again accused Georgia of “increasing preparations to begin an aggression” and firing two RPG-7 shells at the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali and accused EU observers that monitor the Georgian side of the ceasefire line of turning a blind eye to the alleged Georgian military buildup. On January 26, Tbilisi signed an agreement with the EU observer mission to limit its armed presence near South Ossetia and Abkhazia to one battalion (500 men) and exclude all heavy weapons. The South Ossetian authorities called this agreement a sham to cover “the preparation of an aggression” (Interfax, February 9).

The EU monitors in turn say they found no evidence of Georgian troop concentrations near South Ossetia or Abkhazia, or preparations for military action. The EU observer mission announced it would be willing to investigate Ossetian accusations of Georgia’s shelling of Tskhinvali, if it is granted access to the city (Novosti-Gruzia, February 11). This week the South Ossetian police detained two OSCE observers for “illegally crossing into South Ossetian territory” and after three hours expelled them to Georgian-controlled territory. The OSCE protested that the incident had “violated the diplomatic status of the observers.” Tbilisi called the incident a “provocation.” The South Ossetian authorities accusing the OSCE and EU observers of siding with Georgia, said they were “systematically crossing into South Ossetia and increasing tension in the region.” Since last August, foreign observers are not allowed to enter South Ossetia. The authorities in Tskhinvali say they may allow the OSCE back in only after its recognition of South Ossetia’s sovereignty (Interfax, February 11).

After the war with the central authorities in Tbilisi in 1991-1992 during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, separatist South Ossetia continued to be geographically and economically part of Georgia. The borders were open and trade was brisk. Ossetians and the Georgians living in South Ossetia were earning a living on transit trade and contraband through Ossetia into Russia. Now the transit trade is dead and the depleted population of South Ossetia, from where the ethnic Georgians have been ethnically cleansed, is surviving on only limited aid. The only mountain road from South Ossetia to Russia, as always during winter, has been closed by snow for weeks (RIA-Novosti, January 7).

South Ossetia, isolated and with its “independence” unrecognized by the international community, is in crisis. This may explain the constant bellicose statements coming from Tskhinvali: renewed military confrontation may seem the only way to end the unacceptable status quo, established by the August 12 ceasefire.

The belligerence of the separatists is actively supported by Moscow, which has its own reasons to detest the status quo. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced, “Russia is concerned about Georgian troop concentrations near the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” (RIA-Novosti, January 16). EU assurances that there is no “troop concentration” are not accepted. This week the Russian permanent representative in the OSCE, Anvar Azimov, announced, “The Georgians are concentrating troops and heavy weapons, building new bases and checkpoints.” Azimov accused the EU observers of impotence and illegally trying to move their operations into Abkhazia and South Ossetia (RIA-Novosti, February 11).

The ceasefire last August has left the strategically important Russian base in Armenia cut off with no overland military transit connections. The number of Russian soldiers in Armenia is limited to some 4000, but during 2006 and 2007 large amounts of heavy weapons and supplies were moved in under an agreement with Tbilisi from bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki (Georgia). At present there are some 200 Russian tanks, over 300 combat armored vehicles, 250 heavy guns and lots of other military equipment in Armenia – enough to fully arm a battle force of over 20,000 (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, August 20, 2004). Forces in Armenia can be swiftly expanded by bringing in manpower by air transport from Russia. Spares to maintain the armaments may also be shipped in by air, but if a credible overland military transit link is not established within a year or two, there will be no possibility to either replace or modernize equipment. The forces will consequently degrade, undermining Russia’s commitment to defend its ally Armenia and Moscow’s ambition to reestablish its dominance in the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan has accused Russia of handing over to the Armenian military Russian armament holdings on Armenian territory: including 21 tanks, 44 CAVs, 30 guns, other military equipment and munitions (www.bakililar.az, January 10). The Azeris have rejected Russian denials (Interfax, January 20). It is clear that Azerbaijan will not permit military transit into Armenia and Georgia will not do so without serious concessions from Russia on Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

While snow covers the Caucasian mountain passes until May, a renewed war with Georgia is impossible. There is hope in Moscow that the Georgian opposition may still overthrow Mikheil Saakashvili’s regime or that the Obama administration will somehow remove him. However, if by May, Saakashvili remains in power, a military push by Russia to oust him may be seriously contemplated. The constant ceasefire violations could escalate to involve Russian servicemen – constituting a public casus belli. The desire by the West to “reset” relations with Moscow, putting the Georgia issue aside, may be interpreted as a tacit recognition of Russia’s right to use military force.

republished from http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34493

Filed under: Strategic Issues , ceasefire, Coming war, russia's conspiracy theory

Georgian Leaders On External and Internal Threats

Russia may seek instead of repeated military intervention to co-opt Georgian politicians now living in Russia in a bid to fuel domestic political tensions.

In recent weeks, senior Georgian political figures have made a series of public statements in response to persistent media speculation about a possible new Russian military operation against Georgia. The consensus is that no such attack is likely in the immediate future.

But at the same time, President Mikheil Saakashvili and Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili have both hinted over the past week that Russia may seek instead to co-opt Georgian politicians now living in Russia in a bid to fuel domestic political tensions.

Speculation about a new war began in December 2008, largely in response to Russian troop movements in Abkhazia that prompted some Georgian media to predict that Moscow would seek to bring the whole of Georgia under its control before the end of the year.

Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze, however, on December 15 ruled out a resumption of hostilities “in the immediate future.” State Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili similarly said on December 25 that while Russia might stage “minor provocations” on the border between the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Georgia proper, it would not launch any “large-scale aggression.”

In late February, however, just days after the publication by the Jamestown Foundation of an analysis predicting a new Russian onslaught, Givi Targamadze, the hawkish chairman of the Georgian parliament Defense and Security Committee, told journalists that “Russia is clearly preparing for a spring attack.”

A second Georgian parliamentary deputy, Goga Gabashvili, similarly affirmed on February 23 that Russia now seeks to finish the task it failed to accomplish in August 2008, and that its “goals are as clear as noon-day,” namely, to oust Saakashvili, install a new, pro-Moscow leadership, thwart Georgia’s bid for membership of Euro-Atlantic structures, and bring under its controls the pipelines that transport Caspian oil and natural gas via Azerbaijan and Georgia to the West.

But since former Georgian Ambassador to the UN Irakli Alasania issued an ultimatum to Saakashvili on February 23 to schedule a nationwide referendum on whether or not to hold an early presidential election, three top Georgian political figures have downplayed the likelihood of a Russian military attack, while not excluding the possibility that Russia will seek to fuel domestic political unrest.

On February 27, parliament speaker David Bakradze told students that no Russian aggression is expected during the spring of 2009 as Russia is currently too weak. At the same time, Bakradze named several former influential Georgian political figures now living in exile in Russia, including former Ajar leader Aslan Abashidze, who, Bakradze implied, might have an interest in destabilizing Georgia.

Visiting Batumi on March 5, President Saakashvili told journalists that “we do not expect any large-scale aggression” from Russia, but he added that “excessive caution won’t do any harm.”

Then in a rare television interview on March 6, Interior Minister Merabishvili suggested that the Russian leadership may have deliberately circulated rumors of an impending new war in order to “trigger panic in Georgia and scare off investors.”

Merabishvili cited three reasons why he rules out a full-scale Russian attack (as opposed to “minor provocations”) “in the near future.” The first was the U.S.-Georgia charter signed in early January, which Merabishvili claimed “gives [Georgia] a serious security guarantee.” That claim is spurious insofar as the charter is a nonbinding declaration of intent to cooperate in various fields and does not contain any specific commitment by Washington to protect Georgia in the event of an attack. The second was the “deep crisis” currently afflicting the Russian military. And the third was the current level of Russian troop deployment in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

At the same time, Merabishvili inferred that his ministry is aware that unnamed Georgian opposition figures are receiving funding from Russia. Saakashvili had alleged on March 3 that “lots of money” has recently been channeled into Georgian politics, to be used for subversive purposes. Referring to Bakradze’s list of potential Russia-based “spoilers,” Merabishvili added that “at the same time I want to tell you that these people are not key figures who will finance the Georgian opposition or other provocations that may take place in Georgia; such sponsors will be more serious figures,” he added without elaborating.

Unsubstantiated claims that opposition politicians and groups were acting at Moscow’s behest served as the rationale ex post facto for the Georgian authorities’ brutal crackdown on November 7, 2007, on mostly peaceful opposition demonstrators in Tbilisi.

At least one prominent Georgian opposition politician has also responded with skepticism to the ongoing rumors of an impending new Russian attack. Former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze, who recently founded her own opposition movement and has signaled that she would participate in an early presidential ballot, told journalists on February 24 that the Georgian leadership is playing up the putative Russian threat in order to distract the population from the “catastrophic” economic situation and to blacken the opposition by calling into question its loyalty to Georgia.

Filed under: Politics

Pablo Picasso in Pirosmani’s Home

An unprecedented exhibition is coming to Georgia. For the first time in history, works by Pablo Picasso will arrive in the country. Under the agreement of Collaboration between Georgian National Museum and the Ion Department of France, 40 masterpieces will be exhibited in Georgia from May, 30 through September, 6, 2009.

It is worth mentioning that a 10 years history of collaboration unites Georgia’s region of Kakheti and the Department of Ion. And it is Signagi, the beautiful town in this Georgian region, where the exhibition will be opened on May, 30. The unique works of Picasso from private collections never left the Zervo Museum in France. They will be exhibited in Georgia in return to the exhibition of works by Niko Pirosmani, which has received great response in France. “We have this great opportunity to host Picasso’s exhibition. I think it is fantastic that Georgia was chosen. And I would like to express our sincere gratitude to Ion Department and all partners who were supporting this project, and the French Embassy in Georgia,” Micheil Tsereteli, Deputy Director for Educational and Public Programs of Georgian National Museum, told Georgia Today.

During the 1930s, Pirosmani became well-known in France as a “naive” artist, and in 1972 Pablo Picasso even commissioned him with the honor of painting his portrait. Currently Pirosmani’s works are on display in Vilnius, Lithuania. The exhibition will be open until May, 31.

All in all there will be three exhibitions of Picasso’s works in Georgia: in Signagi (May, 30-June, 23), Tbilisi (June, 28 – August, 2) and Batumi (August, 8 – September, 6).

“It is quite an event for Georgia, and since Picasso is a very famous artist across whole world and in Georgia, people here know very much about him. Although, that knowledge is based on books and some secondary information. They have never had a chance to see Picasso’s works in life. This is the first step, which will hopefully be groundbreaking for next similar initiatives,” Nika Rurua, Minister of Culture of Georgia, told Georgia Today. “I am very glad to be a part of it,” Mr. Rurua added.

Currently, The Georgian National Museum is also working on an educational program that will consist of lectures as well as printed materials about Pablo Picasso. “David Lordkipanidze together with his team is working on that and I really support and solute that decision,” Mr. Rurua told Georgia Today.

Filed under: Art

A New NATO Bargain

Before engaging Russia, the U.S. has to convince allies that they’re safe

By RONALD D. ASMUS

Hillary Clinton made her debut yesterday at a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels and today holds her first meeting with her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Geneva. Coming a month before Barack Obama’s inaugural presidential trip to Europe and a NATO summit, this is a chance to hit the reset button not only with Russia but with America’s closest European allies.

NATO is currently divided on two central issues. One is about finding the right balance between maintaining security on the European continent and fighting expeditionary missions in places like Afghanistan. The question is whether Washington can produce a credible strategy that allies believe can succeed and that allied leaders will be willing to invest in. At the moment, that is not the case.

The second, equally critical divide is on Russia and the future of NATO enlargement in the wake of Moscow’s invasion of Georgia last summer. Some allies believe that, in the face of a more nationalistic and aggressive Russia seeking to rollback democracy and reassert its influence over its neighbors, NATO shouldn’t seek any further eastward expansion. This timidity toward Moscow has led some Central and East European NATO members to wonder whether the alliance’s security guarantees are really credible. Their willingness to contribute to Afghanistan is tied to addressing their concerns. Other allies believe those fears are overstated and stress instead the potential benefits of working with Russia on issues ranging from energy to Iran and Afghanistan.

These different impulses need to be reconciled in a new bargain across the Atlantic. To do so, it’s instructive to consider the alliance’s own history. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, NATO had to reconcile the need to counter the insecurity which that invasion produced with the desire to still move forward with Moscow on arms control and other issues. NATO did so by linking deterrence and diplomacy, and embracing a dual-track strategy of defense and detente. It recognized that to engage with Russia, allies had to first feel secure and that allied solidarity was central.

Today we again need to find this balance between strategic reassurance and engagement. The more secure America’s allies feel and the stronger solidarity is within the alliance, the more effective we will be in engaging Russia — on a new security charter and arms-control issues, as well as on missile defense and President Obama’s offer to reconsider the deployment of the missile shield for Russian help to stop the Iranian nuclear threat.

This means we must nip in the bud any doubts member states may have over the alliance’s collective security commitments by engaging in prudent defense planning. This includes establishing a larger NATO presence on the territory of new members consistent with the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Furthermore, NATO must strengthen the reinforcement capabilities for new members and other countries bordering Russia.

The U.S. needs to help its European allies reduce their energy dependency on Russia through projects like Nabucco, a planned pipeline that would transport gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The European Union also needs to stand up to Russian gas monopolists. The EU’s regulatory power can bring American corporate giants to their knees, but Brussels has been unable to bring it to bear to tame Gazprom. That too has to change by liberalizing the EU energy market and coming up with new ways to regulate Russian financial and commercial clout concentrated in the hands of a few firms with close links to the Kremlin. After all, our real concern is that Russia will use its economic assets to divide, manipulate and pressure Europe.

A final issue where we need to overcome our divisions is whether we should continue to work for democratic development in the region between the West and Russia, including through EU and NATO outreach and enlargement. This means coming up with new ways to expand partnership activities to deepen our ties with countries like Ukraine and Georgia as well as expanding the EU’s and NATO’s actual presence on the ground in these countries.

Particularly after the Georgia war, some NATO member states increasingly prefer backing off from such missions. But when we set out to create a new European security system in the early 1990s, a core goal was to provide equal security — a system where big countries could not beat up on little ones.

We enshrined — and Russia accepted — the core principle that any country was free to choose its own path and alliance. Russia’s invasion of Georgia broke those rules and principles. This war took place largely because of Moscow’s desire to thwart Tbilisi’s desire to be independent and to go west.

The Georgians for sure made mistakes. But the West bears its share of blame for not standing up for those core principles and not drawing red lines for Moscow. Europe and the U.S. failed to engage sufficiently in meaningful peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

It would be short-sighted to abandon these principles out of a tactical desire to mollify Moscow or close on some short-term deal. No one today knows where Russia will be in two or even five years’ time, and whether the current financial crisis will tame or further radicalize Russian foreign policy. Working for democratic change on the West’s borders neighboring Russia — as well as in Moscow itself — remains the real key to peace and security in Europe and Eurasia.

We need to engage Moscow. Yesterday’s agreement to resume the NATO-Russia dialogue was an important step. But we also need to pursue a strategy of supporting the kind of democratic change that will truly make Europe a better and safer place. It is that kind of transformation, not acquiescing to Moscow’s demand for spheres of influence, that will produce real partnership and security. So let’s get better, smarter and more realistic about how to pursue these goals, not abandon them. Here, too, we need a reset of Western policy as part of a new bargain across the Atlantic.

Mr. Asmus is executive director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Center and in charge of strategic planning at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. These views are his own.

republished from wall street journal

Filed under: Strategic Issues , NATO, US Allies